APT41 Expands Operations to Africa: A Deep Dive into Chinese Cyberespionage in Government IT Services

Breached Company

22 Jul 2025 — 11 min read

Executive Summary

APT41, the notorious Chinese-speaking cyberespionage group, has expanded its global reach to include Africa, marking a significant shift in the group's targeting strategy. In a recent investigation by Kaspersky's Managed Detection and Response (MDR) team, researchers uncovered a sophisticated attack against government IT services in an African nation. This development is particularly noteworthy as Africa had previously experienced minimal APT41 activity compared to the group's extensive operations across 42 other countries.

The attack demonstrates APT41's continued evolution and adaptation, employing advanced techniques including the compromise of internal SharePoint servers for command and control, sophisticated DLL sideloading methods, and a comprehensive toolkit of both custom and publicly available tools. This incident highlights the growing cybersecurity threats facing African governments and critical infrastructure.

RedVBlue | Cybersecurity Tools

RedVBlue - Cybersecurity Tools Repository

Cybersecurity Tools

Background: Who is APT41?

APT41, also known as Barium, Double Dragon, and Winnti, is one of the most prolific and versatile threat actors in the cybersecurity landscape. This Chinese-speaking group, active since at least 2012, operates with a dual mandate that sets it apart from other Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups:

State-sponsored espionage: Conducting intelligence collection operations on behalf of the Chinese government
Financially motivated cybercrime: Engaging in activities for personal financial gain

The group has historically targeted organizations across multiple sectors, including telecommunications providers, energy companies, educational institutions, healthcare organizations, and IT service providers. Their global footprint spans at least 42 countries, making them one of the most geographically diverse threat actors tracked by security researchers.

The African Campaign: A New Frontier

Initial Detection and Scope

The investigation began when Kaspersky MDR analysts detected suspicious activity on several workstations within a government IT services organization in Africa. The initial alerts showed classic indicators of compromise, including:

Unusual process chains involving svchost.exe → exe → cmd.exe
Command output being written to administrative network shares with numerical file names
Use of WmiExec and Atexec modules from the Impacket toolkit

What made this incident particularly concerning was the attackers' intimate knowledge of the victim's infrastructure. The attackers used hardcoded names of internal services, IP addresses, and proxy servers embedded within their malware. One of the C2s was a captive SharePoint server within the victim's infrastructure.

Attack Methodology and Timeline

Phase 1: Initial Compromise and Reconnaissance

The attack began with the compromise of an unmonitored IIS web server within the organization's infrastructure. The attackers established persistence through a Neo-reGeorg web shell tunnel, which allowed them to proxy traffic from external networks to internal systems. This initial foothold provided the launching point for their broader campaign.

During the reconnaissance phase, the attackers systematically gathered intelligence about the target environment:

Probing for running processes and occupied ports using netstat and tasklist commands
Identifying security solutions such as EDR, MDR, or XDR agents
Mapping network topology and internal services
Assessing available administrative tools and services

Phase 2: Privilege Escalation and Credential Harvesting

APT41 demonstrated their expertise in Windows environments by employing multiple techniques for privilege escalation:

Registry Hive Dumping: The attackers used the built-in reg.exe utility to dump the SYSTEM and SAM registry hives. They executed commands such as:

cmd.exe /c reg save HKLM\SAM C:\Windows\temp\temp_3.log
cmd.exe /c reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\Windows\temp\temp_4.log

Advanced Registry Access: Beyond standard methods, the attackers leveraged RawCopy, a specialized utility that accesses NTFS volumes using low-level disk reading methods, bypassing standard file system protections.

Credential Extraction: The group successfully harvested two critical domain accounts:

A domain account with local administrator rights across all workstations
A backup solution account with domain administrator privileges

This credential compromise was particularly devastating, as it provided the attackers with extensive lateral movement capabilities across the organization's infrastructure.

Phase 3: Lateral Movement and Tool Deployment

Armed with administrative credentials, APT41 began systematic lateral movement throughout the network. They used SMB protocol to transfer their malicious tools to administrative network shares, typically placing files in strategic locations:

C:\WINDOWS\TASKS\
C:\ProgramData\
C:\Users\Public\Downloads\
C:\Users\Public\Videos\
C:\Windows\Help\Help\

The attackers then used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for remote execution, launching their tools across multiple systems in the network.

Technical Analysis: APT41's Evolving Toolkit

Cobalt Strike: The Primary C2 Framework

APT41's use of Cobalt Strike represents a sophisticated approach to command and control operations. Rather than deploying the framework directly, they employed advanced obfuscation and deployment techniques:

Encrypted Deployment: The attackers used Cobalt Strike for C2 communication on compromised hosts. They distributed the tool as an encrypted file, typically with a TXT or INI extension. To decrypt it, they employed a malicious library injected into a legitimate application via DLL sideloading.

DLL Sideloading Variants: The group demonstrated remarkable adaptability by using multiple legitimate applications as vectors for their malicious DLLs:

Legitimate Application	Malicious DLL	Encrypted Payload
TmPfw.exe	TmDbg64.dll	TmPfw.ini
cookie_exporter.exe	msedge.dll	Logs.txt
FixSfp64.exe	log.dll	Logs.txt
360DeskAna64.exe	WTSAPI32.dll	config.ini
KcInst.exe	KcInst32.dll	kcinst.log
MpCmdRunq.exe	mpclient.dll	Logs.txt

Anti-Analysis Measures: The malicious DLLs incorporated several evasion techniques:

Detection of debugging environments
Geographic targeting restrictions (avoiding Japanese, Korean, and Chinese language systems)
Custom decryption routines using 128-bit SSE registers

Custom Agent: SharePoint-Based Command and Control

One of the most innovative aspects of this campaign was APT41's use of a compromised SharePoint server as a command and control infrastructure. The group developed custom C# Trojans (agents.exe and agentx.exe) that communicated with a web shell named CommandHandler.aspx installed on the SharePoint server.

Agent Functionality: The agents executed commands from CommandHandler.aspx using the cmd.exe command shell launched with the /c flag. This approach provided several advantages:

Blended traffic with legitimate SharePoint communications
Reduced suspicion from network monitoring tools
Leveraged trusted internal infrastructure for malicious purposes

Data Exfiltration: The attackers used the upload.ashx web shell for data exfiltration, allowing them to steal sensitive information through the same compromised SharePoint server.

Information Gathering and Data Theft Tools

APT41 deployed a comprehensive suite of information gathering tools, demonstrating their commitment to thorough intelligence collection:

Modified Pillager Stealer

The group employed a customized version of the publicly available Pillager utility, originally written in Chinese. Their modifications included:

Recompilation as a DLL for sideloading execution
Integration with legitimate Microsoft SDK tools
Collection of diverse data types including:
- Browser credentials and saved passwords
- Database credentials and connections
- Administrative tool credentials (MobaXterm)
- Project source code
- Screenshots and active sessions
- Email messages and chat conversations
- SSH and FTP session data
- System information and installed software
- Wi-Fi network credentials

Checkout Stealer

This second stealer focused specifically on financial and browser data:

Saved credit card information
Browser history and downloaded files
Comprehensive credential harvesting
Organized output in CSV format within CheckOutData.zip archives

Mimikatz Implementation

The attackers demonstrated advanced technical capabilities by rewriting Mimikatz as a DLL and deploying it through DLL sideloading. This approach involved:

Using legitimate java.exe as the host process
Loading malicious jli.dll through sideloading
Executing Mimikatz commands for credential extraction
Automated execution through batch scripts

Remote Access: HTA-Based Backdoors

For persistent access, APT41 employed HTML Application (HTA) files delivered through deceptive domains:

Domain Impersonation: The group attempted to mask their malicious activity by using resources that mimicked legitimate ones to download the HTA file. Specifically, the command above reached out to the GitHub-impersonating domain github[.]githubassets[.]net.

JavaScript Payload: The HTA files contained embedded JavaScript that:

Collected initial system information
Established connections using multiple methods (WebSockets, AJAX, Flash)
Transmitted unique attack identifiers to command and control servers
Provided alternative access channels for continued operations

Attribution and Intelligence Assessment

Kaspersky attributes this attack to APT41 with high confidence based on multiple convergent indicators:

Tactical, Technical, and Procedural (TTP) Similarities: The attackers used a number of tools characteristic of APT41, such as Impacket, WMI, and Cobalt Strike. The group's methodology closely matched established APT41 patterns across multiple campaign elements.

Infrastructure Patterns: The C2 domain names identified in this incident (s3-azure.com, *.ns1.s3-azure.com, *.ns2.s3-azure.com) are similar to domain names previously observed in APT41 attacks (us2[.]s3bucket-azure[.]online, status[.]s3cloud-azure[.]com).

Technical Signatures: The use of DLL sideloading techniques, specific file placement patterns in C:\Windows\Temp, and the combination of custom and publicly available tools all align with APT41's established operational patterns.

Strategic Implications for African Cybersecurity

Expanding Threat Landscape

APT41's entry into African cyberspace represents a significant escalation in the threat landscape facing the continent. This development has several strategic implications:

Infrastructure Targeting: The focus on government IT services suggests APT41's interest in critical national infrastructure and sensitive government communications.

Intelligence Collection: The comprehensive data collection tools deployed indicate a long-term intelligence gathering operation rather than a simple financial crime.

Operational Expansion: Africa's inclusion in APT41's target set reflects the continent's growing strategic importance and digital transformation initiatives.

Vulnerability Factors

Several factors made this attack particularly effective and concerning:

Incomplete Monitoring Coverage: Some time ago, Kaspersky MDR analysts detected a targeted attack against government IT services in the African region... some assets weren't connected to monitoring systems, which prevented us from seeing the full picture immediately.

Privileged Account Misuse: The attackers successfully leveraged overprivileged accounts across multiple systems, highlighting fundamental identity and access management weaknesses.

Internal Infrastructure Compromise: The use of SharePoint servers for command and control demonstrates how trusted internal systems can be weaponized against organizations.

Defensive Recommendations and Lessons Learned

Immediate Tactical Measures

Based on the attack analysis, organizations should implement the following defensive measures:

Comprehensive Monitoring: Deploy security monitoring across all infrastructure assets without exception. Partial coverage provides attackers with blind spots to exploit.

Privilege Management: It's also crucial to maintain maximum coverage of your infrastructure with security tools that can automatically block malicious activity in the initial stages. Finally, we strongly advise against granting excessive privileges to accounts, and especially against using such accounts on all hosts across the infrastructure.

DLL Sideloading Protection: Implement application whitelisting and code signing verification to prevent DLL sideloading attacks.

SharePoint Security: Regularly audit SharePoint installations for unauthorized web shells and implement file integrity monitoring.

Strategic Security Improvements

Zero Trust Architecture: Implement zero trust principles, particularly for service accounts and administrative access.

Advanced Threat Detection: Deploy behavioral analytics and artificial intelligence-driven threat detection to identify advanced persistent threats.

Incident Response Preparation: Develop and regularly test incident response procedures specific to APT-level threats.

International Cooperation: Establish relationships with international cybersecurity organizations for threat intelligence sharing.

Technical Indicators of Compromise

File Hashes (MD5)

2F9D2D8C4F2C50CC4D2E156B9985E7CA
9B4F0F94133650B19474AF6B5709E773
A052536E671C513221F788DE2E62316C
91D10C25497CADB7249D47AE8EC94766
C3ED337E2891736DB6334A5F1D37DC0F

Command and Control Infrastructure

47.238.184[.]9
38.175.195[.]13
s3-azure[.]com
github[.]githubassets[.]net
msn-microsoft[.]org
upload-microsoft[.]com

MITRE ATT&CK Framework Mapping

The attack employed numerous techniques mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Initial Access: T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application)

Execution: T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter)

Persistence: T1543.003 (Windows Service), T1505.003 (Web Shell)

Privilege Escalation: T1574.002 (DLL Side-Loading)

Defense Evasion: T1027 (Obfuscated Files or Information)

Credential Access: T1003 (OS Credential Dumping)

Lateral Movement: T1021.002 (SMB/Windows Admin Shares)

Collection: T1005 (Data from Local System)

Command and Control: T1071.001 (Web Protocols)

Exfiltration: T1041 (Exfiltration Over C2 Channel)

Conclusion

APT41's expansion into Africa represents a significant development in global cybersecurity threats. The sophisticated nature of this campaign, combining advanced persistent threat techniques with intimate knowledge of local infrastructure, demonstrates the group's continued evolution and growing capabilities.

For African nations and organizations, this incident serves as a critical wake-up call. The attack's success was facilitated by fundamental security gaps that remain common across many developing cybersecurity programs: incomplete monitoring coverage, excessive account privileges, and insufficient protection of critical internal infrastructure.

The international cybersecurity community must respond to this development with increased cooperation and support for African cybersecurity capabilities. As APT41 and similar threat actors expand their global reach, no nation or region can afford to remain unprepared for advanced persistent threats.

Organizations worldwide should take note of APT41's tactical innovations, particularly their use of internal SharePoint servers for command and control and their sophisticated DLL sideloading techniques. These methods represent the cutting edge of APT capabilities and require equally advanced defensive measures.

The battle for cyberspace is truly global, and APT41's African campaign demonstrates that sophisticated nation-state threats respect no borders. Only through comprehensive security measures, international cooperation, and continuous vigilance can organizations and nations defend against such advanced adversaries.